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Acoustic injustice: The experience of listening to indistinct covert recordings
presented as evidence in court
Abstract
Audio recorded by hidden listening devices can provide powerful evidence in criminal trials. Unfortunately
these covert recordings are often indistinct, to the extent the court needs a transcript to understand the
content. Australian law allows police to provide transcripts as ‘ad hoc experts’. Legal procedures
incorporate safeguards intended to ensure the transcripts are not misleading. The problem is that these
safeguards have been shown to be ineffective, with multiple examples of inaccurate transcripts being
provided to ‘assist’ the jury in determining what is said and who is saying it. The present paper explains
the problem, provides an accessible overview of the nature of speech and how speech perception works,
and outlines the solution proposed by the Research Hub for Language in Forensic Evidence to the
‘acoustic injustice’ embodied in current legal procedures.
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Acoustic injustice: The experience of
listening to indistinct covert recordings
presented as evidence in court
Helen Fraser and Debbie Loakes1
1. Introduction
One of the most important acoustic experiences in court is that of
listening to covert recordings. Covert recordings are conversations
captured by telephone intercept or a hidden listening device, without
the knowledge of the participants. When used as evidence in a criminal
trial, covert recordings allow the court to have the experience of
‘hearing with their own ears’ as speakers make admissions they would
not make openly. This can provide powerfully persuasive evidence,
exerting a strong influence on anybody exposed to it: lawyers, judges,
even journalists and other commentators – but most importantly, on
the jury.
The very power of covert recordings also gives them the potential
to be powerfully misleading, if the evidence they present is erroneous
(Fishman 2006). For this reason it is essential that the jury reach a
reliable understanding regarding who is speaking, and what they are
saying. Hearing spoken language accurately can be difficult under any
circumstances (Burridge 2017). Yet a common characteristic of covert
recordings creates a particular problem: since it is hard to record good
quality audio in secret, the content is often indistinct, to the extent it
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cannot be understood without assistance.

In such cases, Australian law allows the jury to be provided with
several kinds of assistance, the most important of which is a transcript
setting out relevant utterances, and attributing each to a speaker. Of
course, the law recognises that it is essential to ensure the court is not
inadvertently misled by the ‘assistance’ of an unreliable transcript. To
avoid this, a number of safeguards have been developed (discussed in
more detail below). However, these safeguards rely heavily on lawyers
and other listeners experiencing a sense of personal confidence that
they hear the content represented by the transcript in the audio.
Unfortunately, as the present paper explains, this experience of personal
confidence is known to be surprisingly unreliable, creating actual and
potential injustice (Fraser 2018a).

These and other issues prompted Australian linguistic scientists
to raise a Call to Action – a 2017 letter, endorsed by all four national
linguistics organisations, asking the judiciary to review and reform
the handling of indistinct covert recordings in four main areas:
transcription of English language utterances, translation of nonEnglish utterances, attribution of utterances to speakers, and admission
of ‘enhanced’ versions of the audio (Fraser 2018b). The present paper
focuses on just two of these areas: identifying who is speaking and what
is being said in indistinct English audio. It starts with a brief overview
of issues related to covert recordings, first from a legal perspective, and
then from a linguistic science perspective. Next it calls attention to the
mismatch between these perspectives, and the problems that result
from that mismatch, first in relation to determining what is said, and
then in relation to attributing relevant utterances to particular speakers.
Finally, it describes the ‘acoustic injustice’ arising from the mismatch,
and indicates the way forward recommended by Australian linguists.
2. Covert recordings in legal perspective
A basic legal principle is that understanding spoken or written
English requires only common knowledge. This means that, whereas
DNA, fingerprints and other kinds of forensic evidence require specialist
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interpretation, covert recordings are expected to be understood directly
by the jury – much as they understand the statements of witnesses
testifying in person. This is part of what makes covert recordings such
powerful evidence: admissions the jury may hear can be considered
to be direct, as opposed to circumstantial, evidence (see for example
Martin 2014: 340).

An obstacle arises when (as often happens) recordings are so
indistinct that the jury cannot understand the content simply by
listening as the audio is played in court. This is where current Australian
law, following the landmark High Court decision in Butera v DPP
(1987), allows assistance to be provided in the form of a transcript,
setting out what is said in the recording and attributing each utterance
to a speaker. For English language recordings, the transcript is typically
created by detectives from the case, who are deemed to be ‘ad hoc
experts’ on the grounds that they have gained specialised knowledge
in relation to the audio by listening to it many times (Edmond et al
2009). Of course the risk is recognised that police transcripts might not
always be fully accurate, and important precedents have established a
number of safeguards to mitigate the risk (for example Eastman v the
Queen [1997]; R v Cassar [1999]).

The first, crucial, safeguard is the expectation that the defence will
listen to the audio carefully, check the police transcript critically, and
bring any differences of opinion to the attention of the prosecution.
Another safeguard is the expectation that, in the event of differences
not resolvable between the parties, the judge will listen personally
at a voir dire. If the judge detects specifically misleading elements,
the transcript can be excluded. However, the normal expectation is
that evaluation of competing transcripts should be left as a matter for
the jury, on the grounds that, since understanding English language
requires only common knowledge, the jury is in the best position to
determine the content of an indistinct covert recording, taking into
account all the evidence and advice provided throughout the trial.
To ensure they do this properly, the final and most important
safeguard is the judge’s instruction to the jury that they should not
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simply accept the transcript, but must listen carefully to the audio and
reach their own conclusion regarding what is said and who says it, using
the transcript(s) only as an aid (this is the ‘aide memoire instruction’).
These procedures have been routine for more than thirty years, and
are familiar and uncontroversial from the perspective of Australian
law. Nevertheless, from the perspective of linguistic science, they are
deeply concerning.
3. Linguistic science perspective
3a) Common knowledge vs linguistic science

Over recent decades, linguistic science has found that many widely
held beliefs about language and speech are false (Bauer et al1998).
Unfortunately, relevant findings have been slow to percolate through
to the broader community. This means that confident false beliefs
about language and speech remain widespread, even among educated
professionals, including lawyers, and scientists from other disciplines.
This section gives a brief informal overview of findings relevant to
the present discussion (for more detail see Fraser 2014 and references
therein).
3b) The nature of speech

An important characteristic of spoken language is that it is
ephemeral: utterances disappear before listeners have a chance to study
them in detail. Nowadays we have recording technology that lets us
capture and analyse speech, but for many centuries, the only way to
preserve a record of what was said was via writing. Written language
developed in many forms around the world (Daniels et al 1996), with
profound consequences, not just for the societies that use it (Olson 1994)
but for their conception of speech itself (Harris 1986). In our society,
alphabetic literacy has promoted the belief that speech is much like
printed text: a sequence of discrete words, each made up of a sequence
of discrete, invariant ‘sounds’ or, more technically, ‘segments’ (Linell
1988). However this belief, though widespread, is quite false (for
engaging and accessible discussion, see Port 2007).
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Through careful auditory analysis, linguists have long known that
individual segments actually have a far greater range of variation than
listeners realise (Bloomfield 1933). This variation is usually explained
as being due to ‘coarticulation’ between neighbouring sounds (for
example the /s/ in ‘sue’ is subtly different from the /s/ in ‘sea’, due to
coarticulation with the subsequent lip-rounded vowel).

During the 1940s-60s, development of technology for recording
speech and analysing its acoustic structure showed that segmental
variability was far greater than previously recognised (Shankweiler
et al 2015). Further research spurred by this discovery demonstrated
the ‘alphabetic conception’ of speech to be thoroughly misleading
(Appelbaum 1999). In reality, speech is not a sequence of discrete units,
but a continuous stream of sound, reflecting the dynamic and highly
variable processes by which it is articulated (Ladefoged et al 2012). A
small impression of its nature can be given by considering it to be more
like ‘running writing’ than printed text. However, even the clearest of
speech is like extremely messy running writing – with no spaces even
between words, let alone between letters. This means that, amazing
as it might seem, there is no set of acoustic features that is always and
only associated with any particular segment (in more technical terms,
there is no 1:1 relationship between any unit of acoustics and any unit
of perception).
This raises the question of how listeners perceive the words and
segments they are so keenly aware of in experience. While there are
many competing theories, there is broad agreement regarding basic
principles (Magnuson et al 2013).
3c) How speech perception works

For proficient speakers, understanding spoken language seems
so effortless it is often assumed to be a simple process of recognising
‘sounds’ (‘c-a-t’) and putting them together into words (‘cat’). However,
the discovery, discussed in the previous section, that segments do not
exist independently even in clear speech, shows that this assumption
must be false. Actually, speech perception involves not recognising
sounds but constructing them, via a suite of complex (though almost
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entirely unconscious) mental processes. Its effortlessness is testament
not to its simplicity, but to the immense proficiency speakers develop
over years of practice (Cutler 2012).

The ability to recognise and discriminate segments is strongly
dependent on this proficiency (this is why it is so difficult to identify
sounds in a foreign language). Even local dialect proficiency can be
relevant. For one example, even in Australia, where dialect differences
are minimal, listeners from southern Victoria may be unable to
discriminate words like ‘celery’ and ‘salary’, which those from northern
Victoria readily hear as different (Loakes et al 2014).
Even for proficient speakers, however, the acoustic information in
the continuous stream of speech is not enough on its own to enable
words to be recognised. This is often found hard to believe, but is
easy to demonstrate by excising words or phrases from a recorded
conversation. Words that are perfectly clear when heard in the context
of the conversation are typically unintelligible when played on their
own (Shockey 2003). In order to understand speech, listeners must
combine the acoustic information in each word with information
from other sources – and everyday conversation offers many other
sources of information. Within speech itself, there is a great deal of
‘suprasegmental’ and ‘paralinguistic’ information – rhythm, intonation,
voice quality and other characteristics that extend beyond individual
words, making speech a far richer and more complex signal than can be
captured with a segmental (alphabetic) representation (Clark et al 2007)

In addition, listeners can use visual information to see who is
speaking, and, by following speakers’ gaze or gestures, identify objects
or events they refer to. Information from the facial expressions that
accompany speech are particularly salient (Diehl et al 2005). One
interesting example is the ‘McGurk effect’, whereby perception of the
same acoustic information can be radically changed by superimposing
video of speakers articulating /ba/, /ga/ or /fa/ (it is worth experiencing
this in multimedia).2
The need to juggle so much information from disparate sources
means that speech perception is prone to a surprising number of errors
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(Shockey et al 2014). Most are barely noticed, since they are corrected on
the fly, as part of the perceptual process. As the unfolding speech creates
its own internal context, listeners simply update their understanding,
only mentioning transient errors if they happen to be humorous (for
example ‘I thought you asked me to send an all-star female – but
then I realised you must have meant all-staff email’). On the rare
occasion that hearing-errors create genuine misunderstanding, they
are readily corrected via intervention from the interlocutor, allowing
the conversation to continue seamlessly.

Considering the nature of speech, however, what is surprising is
not that so many hearing-errors occur, but rather that errors are not
more frequent, and more disruptive. Why, for a simple example, do we
readily seize on the phrase ‘recognise speech’, without even noticing
that ‘wreck a nice beach’ is an equally plausible way to interpret the
acoustic information? The reason is found in what is perhaps the most
intriguing, though least observable, source of information needed
for speech perception: the listener’s tacit and constantly updating
expectations about what the upcoming speech is likely to be about.
These expectations guide or ‘prime’ perception in ways that are hard to
recognise except via experimental studies that control listeners’ access
to contextual information (Warren 2012).
In short, speech perception is far from the ‘direct’ observation of
sounds and words assumed by the legal perspective. It is an active,
dynamic, predictive, collaborative process, in which segmental acoustics
plays an important but relatively minor role. Its key characteristic is
listeners’ use of inference, interpretation and feedback in constructing
a meaningful and contextually relevant message. The only difference
from other inferential reasoning is that it mostly occurs without
conscious awareness.
3d) Listening to recorded speech

A major benefit of recording technology is the ability to make speech
available to listeners who are not physically present (for example via
radio broadcast). At first this was limited to prepared monologues.
Producing recordings of speakers in spontaneous conversation had to
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await technology to record and mix high quality audio from multiple
microphones. Even now that the technology is available, recording
intelligible audio requires management. For example, a radio talk-show
host has to ensure participants speak one at a time, minimise overlaps
and interruptions, mention speakers’ names frequently, and so on.
Without such intervention, conversation is typically difficult to follow
from a recording, even if it was perfectly clear to the participants. The
reason is that the recording takes speech out of its context, denying
listeners the visual information they use in everyday conversation to
identify speakers and resolve overlapping utterances. This is why the
well-known ‘cocktail party effect’, whereby listeners can focus their
attention on speech in a noisy environment does not work for recorded
speech (Arons 1992).

Another benefit of improved recording techniques has been its
enabling of advanced research on discourse and conversation analysis,
which has given insight into the structure of conversation (Sidnell et al
2012), and the nature of spontaneous speech (Shockey 2003). One key
observation from this research is that conversational speech is highly
elliptical. Since speakers know that listeners can retrieve information
from the context, they do not bother to specify every detail. In a
recording, however, the omitted information is no longer retrievable,
making the speech hard to understand. To extend the analogy with
running writing, it could be said that listening to a (high quality)
recorded conversation is like reading a Twitter thread rendered in
extremely messy handwriting with no gaps between words or letters
– incomprehensible without contextual information.
The interesting thing is that such a recording is less difficult to
understand than the analogy might suggest. The reason is that, where
listeners do not have access to the real context, they use more abstract
contextual information obtained from external sources. This has
been demonstrated by numerous experiments. In one example, from
Germany, researchers played the same recording to several groups of
listeners, priming each group with different information regarding
the speaker’s regional dialect (Jannedy & Weirich 2014). Though
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the priming was very subtle (the region was not referred to explicitly,
merely noted on the response sheet), participants heard the speech in
line with expectations about how speakers from that region pronounce
particular words. Similarly strong perceptual effects have been shown
for Australian and New Zealand listeners, using even subtler priming
(Hay et al 2006).
Experiments like these show the strong assistance provided by
contextual priming, without the listener’s conscious awareness. Other
research has added an important new concept. While contextual
priming is generally helpful in everyday life, listeners’ heavy reliance
on its assistance creates a perceptual vulnerability in understanding
recorded speech. Priming with inaccurate contextual information
does not, as might be expected, reduce understanding. Rather it
encourages confident but inaccurate understanding. The effect is that
listeners can be easily and unwittingly manipulated into confident
but erroneous perception, especially if the audio has any degree of
indistinctness (Fraser 2014 discusses all this in detail, while videos at
forensictranscription.net.au provide compelling multimedia examples).

These and many other demonstrations show that the risk of
perceptual error is far higher for recorded conversation than for inperson conversation – and of course the most important feature of
a recording is that the speaker is not available to provide immediate
feedback regarding errors that cause misunderstanding.
3e) Transcribing recorded speech

One further benefit of recording technology is the possibility for
official events such as court or parliamentary proceedings to be captured
in full detail. Useful as such recordings are, however, they are not
nearly so convenient as the written documents traditionally provided by
stenographers. For this reason, audio recordings are usually transcribed,
to provide a ‘verbatim’ record.
Transcribing any recorded spoken interaction is difficult. Depending
on the various factors discussed above, simply understanding the
content of the discourse can be hard enough. Writing down each and
every word can be extremely challenging (further demonstration, if
413
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needed, that understanding does not result from simple ‘bottom up’
recognition of readily observable segments). However, the range of
difficulty spans a long continuum. While it definitely requires more
than common knowledge, producing transcripts of recorded court
proceedings is at the ‘relatively easy’ end of that continuum.
For one thing, court recordings are generally of at least fair quality,
and the speech is monitored to ensure that only one voice is heard at
a time (the judge in a courtroom performing a similar function to
that of the radio host mentioned earlier, by reminding witnesses to
answer verbally rather than with gestures, asking for difficult words
to be spelled out, and so on). For another thing, the transcriber
is trained in the use of appropriate equipment, and provided with
background information to assist with difficult material (for example
names of speakers and technical terms). Interestingly, even with all
these advantages, initial versions of court transcripts often contain
errors. Fortunately, they can usually be checked by the participants,
and corrections made.

Importantly, however, even the best court transcript is far from
being truly ‘verbatim’. This was discovered by sociolinguistics
researchers who sought to use existing transcripts as the basis for
analysis of courtroom discourse (Eades 1996). The very ‘tidiness’
that is valued in court transcripts is a disadvantage for research, as it
omits or alters many of the very features of natural spoken language
that researchers most want to study (Voutilainen et al 2019). Various
researchers’ need for transcripts that include all the detail relevant
for their studies has led to development of many different forms of
transcript, suited to the objectives of different disciplines (Heselwood
2013). All are valuable for their purposes. However, no transcript, no
matter how detailed or how accurate, is ever equivalent to the recording
(much less to the original discourse) – as can easily be demonstrated by
reading the transcript aloud and comparing the result with the audio
(Komter 2019 takes up this topic in a highly relevant study). This is not
a criticism of transcribers. It merely demonstrates that any transcript
requires abstracting from the rich and complex recording to create an
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artefact suitable for a particular purpose – in much the same way as any
map requires abstracting from the terrain it represents (Dibiase 2018).
Lack of recognition of the abstract nature of transcripts creates
major problems in court, even for overt recordings (Haworth 2018).
Covert recordings raise far more serious issues.
4. Forensic transcription
4a) A highly specialised task requiring independence, skill and
process

With the background above, we can turn to consider transcription
of indistinct covert recordings. Clearly, the task is far harder than
transcribing court recordings. On first acquaintance, the main reason
appears to be the poor quality of the audio. It is true that indistinct
covert recordings are typically of far worse quality than anything that
is normally transcribed for court (or other) purposes – and ‘enhancing’
techniques are rarely, if ever, fully effective (Fraser 2020a).
However, audio quality is only one of the features that make
forensic transcription different from court transcription, and not the
most important. Another difference is that covert recordings usually
feature unmonitored conversation, often with multiple participants who
share enough contextual knowledge to let them use highly elliptical
expressions. As we have seen, even in a good quality recording, such
material is hard to understand (our analogy likened it to a Twitter
thread, rendered in messy handwriting with no spaces). A poor quality
recording greatly exacerbates the difficulty (as if the messy handwriting
was rendered in pale ink on thin paper that has become soiled and
damaged). In order to understand material like this, listeners must have
contextual information. Without it, as discussed earlier, the audio is
simply unintelligible.

This highlights one of the most important differences between
court transcription and forensic transcription: in the latter, the context
may not be known, or if it is, relevant aspects may be contested, or
simply wrong. This creates the risk of the transcriber being exposed
to unreliable contextual information. As we have seen, unreliable
415
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contextual information is liable to induce inaccurate perception –
resulting in an inaccurate transcript. Unfortunately, even ensuring
the transcriber receives only reliable contextual information does not
guarantee accurate perception. The only way to be absolutely sure a
transcript is reliable is by checking it against ‘ground truth’ (accurate,
uncontestable knowledge of what was really said). This raises the most
crucial difference between forensic and other transcription: ground
truth is not available – that is why it is necessary to task the jury with
determining what was said, using the transcript as assistance.

For all these reasons and more, forensic transcription is not
just harder than court transcription. It is actually harder than the
transcription undertaken by advanced researchers in conversation
analysis or phonetic science. We end with one final consideration: the
consequences of error. In forensic transcription the stakes are far higher
than in academic research. To avoid serious injustice, it is essential to
avoid any possibility of misleading the jury with unreliable ‘assistance’.

From the perspective of linguistic science, then, it is clear that
achieving appropriate reliability for forensic transcription requires
independent transcribers with demonstrable skill, following an
evidence-based process that provides them with necessary, relevant and
reliable contextual information, while shielding them from misleading
or biasing assumptions, at least until they have formed their own
preliminary interpretation of the audio (cf Dror et al 2015). Clearly
there is a major mismatch between this practice, required from the
perspective of linguistic science, and the practice currently used in
Australian courts as outlined in Section 2 above.
4b) Mismatch between legal perspective and linguistic science
perspective

While the discussion above is far from a full explanation of issues
in forensic transcription, it may give some insight into why linguistic
scientists are so concerned about current legal practice: it embodies a
paradoxical situation, whereby unusually difficult audio, used in contexts
where the consequences of error are unusually severe, is transcribed
and evaluated by personnel with unusually low qualifications (‘listening
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many times’ is necessary but not sufficient: it is quite possible to be
wrong every time).

The reason for the mismatch can be traced to a major error in the
fundamental principle on which legal practice is based: the concept that
understanding spoken language requires only common knowledge. This
may be reasonable in relation to some forms of speech in some contexts
(for example, listening to court proceedings). However, extending it to
the assertion that understanding indistinct covert recordings requires
only common knowledge involves a serious fallacy.

Ensuring reliable understanding of indistinct covert recordings
requires advanced expertise of a level similar to that required for
DNA or other expert evidence (Fraser 2018b). The difference is that,
where DNA evidence is opaque to the court in the absence of expert
interpretation, listening to an indistinct covert recording may give
listeners an experience of understanding the content for themselves.
However, this ability to ‘hear with one’s own ears’ does not make
the evidence ‘direct’ – it merely hides crucial inferential reasoning
below the level of conscious awareness (Section 3c). This makes it
even more essential with audio than with DNA to protect juries from
misleading ‘assistance’, by ensuring they are only ever exposed to
reliable transcripts.
Current law, however, allows police transcripts to ‘assist’ juries.
This is problematic, not just because police lack genuine expertise
in transcription. Police transcribers are further hindered by having
contextual information that is potentially unreliable (having not
yet been tested by the trial process). As we have seen (Section 3d),
while contextual information can confer useful insight regarding the
interpretation of particular indistinct phrases, it is equally possible that
it will mislead perception. And indeed it is known that police transcripts
are frequently inaccurate (French and Fraser 2018).

So while police suggestions should certainly form part of the input,
at an appropriate stage, to an expert transcription process, ensuring their
suggestions are not misleading requires specialist evaluation. The law,
however, leaves evaluation to lawyers. Most of the safeguards (Section
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2) involve lawyers experiencing a sense of personal confidence that the
police transcript assists their own perception (Gray 2018). The problem,
as explained above, is that this experience is highly unreliable. The effect
is that listeners are unlikely to detect and correct all relevant errors.
That in turn means it is common for juries to be given erroneous
police transcripts, with only the aide memoire instruction to protect
them from being misled (Fraser 2018b). Unfortunately, this final
safeguard too is unrealistic. As explained in Section 3d, a transcript
inevitably has a powerful and lasting effect on perception of indistinct
audio, even if it is inaccurate. It is very unlikely listeners will successfully
‘reset’ their perception to give equal consideration to alternative
interpretations – making the aide memoire instruction one more way
in which juries are asked to ‘do the impossible’ (cf Tiersma 2009). The
overall effect is extraordinary privilege for the police interpretation of
indistinct covert recordings.

Lacking insight into the factors that affect speech perception, the
law has invested unwarranted confidence in police transcripts, both
in specific cases and in general. Since the transcript is not considered
to be evidence, but only ‘assistance’ in understanding the evidence,
police ‘ad hoc experts’ are subject to none of the scrutiny that genuine
expert evidence is given (Roberts 2020). There are known examples
of demonstrably inaccurate police transcripts having been admitted
as assistance to the jury despite careful checking by lawyers and even
judges – and it is certain there are more, as yet unknown (Fraser 2018a).
The threat to justice is evident.
5. Speaker attribution
This section turns from the question of what was said to consider
difficulties in establishing, with reliability appropriate for a criminal
trial, who said it.
5a) Linguistic science perspective

We all have the daily experience of recognising the voices of people
we know. The fact that we are usually right gives confidence in listeners’
ability to recognise speakers by their voices. It also gives confidence
418
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in the ‘common knowledge’ explanation for the ability: voices have
unique features which listeners come to recognise, through familiarity.
However, both of these concepts have been shown to be incorrect.

First, speakers do not have unique voices (Rose 2002, Watt et al
2020). This is one reason that responsible experts deprecate the term
‘voiceprint’, and its suggestion of an analogy with fingerprints (the
technical term is ‘spectrogram’). There is of course a great deal of
variation between the voices of different speakers. However, voices
are highly complex signals that also vary greatly within the speech of
any individual: consider the difference in the voice of the same person
speaking angrily to a colleague, formally to a boss or lovingly to a child.
It is well known, from twin studies and other research on similarsounding speakers, that within-speaker variation can be as great as or
greater than between-speaker variation (Loakes 2008, in press) – and
that is without even considering the possibility of deliberate disguise.

This counter-intuitive fact is confirmed by the observation that there
are currently no methods that allow reliable identification of a voice
from an open population in anything remotely like what is possible
with fingerprints (Foulkes et al 2012) – and it is useful to recall that
even fingerprint identification is far from infallible (Campbell 2011,
Walvisch 2017). The increasing success of voice verification services (for
example for lodging tax claims by telephone) depends on reducing the
population of possible speakers by requiring input of personal details
such as date of birth and tax file number. It also simplifies the task by
requiring the speaker to cooperate in producing standard phrases for
comparison. While the results are impressive (though not foolproof),
such constraints make the methods unsuitable for forensic purposes.
Second, while listeners certainly do recognise speakers’ voices, they
do not recognise speakers by their voices. As with speech perception,
speaker recognition relies far more heavily than listeners realise on
priming by contextual expectations. Experiments that deprive listeners
of contextual information, forcing them to use only the voice itself,
show surprisingly poor performance, and, importantly, poor correlation
between listeners’ confidence and accuracy (Kreiman et al 2011). This
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is why earwitnesses, who identify speakers based on memory of having
‘heard that voice before’, are even less reliable than eyewitnesses (Fraser
2019) – and eyewitnesses, as is well known, are notoriously fallible
(Gould et al 2012).
Third, while having a recording of an offender’s voice reduces the
need to rely on a listener’s memory, it is by no means a panacea for the
problems of unreliable speaker identification. The handwriting analogy
we have been developing might help explain this. If clear speech is like
messy running writing with no gaps, then identifying voices is at least
as problematic as identifying authorship of a handwritten text – a task
for which common knowledge notoriously overestimates reliability,
and even experts are surprisingly fallible (Found et al 2013). In fact,
even in clear recordings, recognising voices is far more problematic
than recognising handwriting, due to listeners’ poor ability to provide
valid descriptions even of apparently basic features like pitch or accent
(Tomkinson et al 2018). The fact that covert recordings are often
indistinct only adds to these problems (making it like recognising the
author of messy handwriting in pale ink on thin, soiled paper).
With this brief background, we can review the legal perspective
on identifying speakers whose voices are heard in covert recordings.
5b) Legal perspective

Utterances in covert recordings are generally attributed to specific
speakers as part of the police transcript. In addition, investigators may
testify as ‘ad hoc experts’ that they recognise voices in covert recordings,
on the grounds that familiarity with the voices, gained through their
work on the investigation, gives them specialised knowledge. However,
as discussed above, no one can reliably identify voices from an open
population. Familiarity may assist in some cases, but is no guarantee
of accuracy (Yarmey 2004), especially in cases where cognitive bias
may be a factor (Smith et al 2014).

For many types of covert recordings, there is also external evidence
regarding the identity of the speakers, for example from personal
surveillance, or from information about time, location and phone
numbers in intercepted calls. While these kinds of external evidence
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are obviously useful in themselves, it is important not to misunderstand
their relationship to the evidence obtained from the voices themselves.
It is often assumed that such external evidence confirms investigators’
voice recognition. However, this could only be (potentially) correct
if investigators first recognised the voices independently, and then
reviewed the external evidence. Of course, this is not what happens in
practice: the whole basis of investigators’ ‘ad hoc expertise’ is (putative)
familiarity with the voices gained through their work on the case as
a whole. It seems clear that in many or most cases, what really helps
investigators identify speakers is the external evidence, with the
voice characteristics adding confirmation. This is not necessarily a
problem in itself. The problem is the fallacious assumption, which
gives unwarranted confidence in the ability of police to identify
speakers, both in specific cases and in general. The effect of this circular
reasoning is to give yet more privilege to the police interpretation of
covert recordings.
Recent years have seen more frequent use of expert witnesses in
relation to speaker identification. Unfortunately, however, it can be
difficult for the courts to distinguish real expertise from pseudoscience,
and even genuine expert opinion is seen only as an alternative to the
police identification, with the choice between them left to the jury
(Edmond et al 2011). As a consequence, multiple cases of ‘acoustic
injustice’ are known (Catanzaro 2015).
5c) Capabilities and limitations of expert analysis

While voices cannot be uniquely identified from an open population,
there is still a great deal of useful evidence that expert analysts can
provide (Foulkes et al 2012), usually by comparing voice samples from
an ‘unknown’ or ‘disputed’ recording (typically featuring one or more
offenders’ voices) with a sample from a ‘known’ recording (typically
from a police interview, or some other context where the speaker can
be unequivocally identified).
An essential consideration in making this kind of comparison (Rose
2002), as in any forensic comparison evidence (Aitken et al 2010), is
to avoid the common pitfall of focusing on similarities between the
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known and unknown samples, with insufficient consideration of the
distinctiveness of the similar features. For a simple example, consider an
unknown sample featuring a male voice with an average pitch around
120 Hz. The fact that the known sample features a male voice with
a similar average pitch is not, in itself, of much forensic value, since
many male voices have this pitch. The principle is the same as in the
intuitively more obvious case of an offender and a suspect both having
brown hair: this similarity is of limited value – unless the population of
possible offenders can be reduced in some reliable way to include very
few people with brown hair, making this a distinctive characteristic.

However, forensic voice comparison is substantially more
problematic than other types of superficially similar expert evidence.
One reason is the very large overlap of within-speaker and betweenspeaker variability already mentioned, which affects almost every
characteristic of voices. This makes it essential, but difficult, to ensure
samples are fully commensurate (i.e. that known and unknown
samples compare like with like). It also makes it very difficult to collect
population statistics for specific voice characteristics, and to use them
in meaningful ways (Morrison et al 2016).
For these and other reasons, despite extensive research, we still have
nothing like a standard method for forensic voice comparison, certainly
not one that can be applied in a context-independent manner (Gold
et al 2019). In most cases, reliable information about other evidence
in the case is needed to narrow the population of possible speakers.
Unfortunately, it is still not entirely clear how best to enable experts
to make use of reliable information about the case, while minimising
the risk of cognitive bias (Kinoshita et al 2015). This and many other
issues are still under active discussion by researchers.

Another issue is the difficulty of determining the ‘defence
hypothesis’. Statistical comparison of samples requires determining a
‘likelihood ratio’ representing the likelihood of observing the data under
competing hypotheses. While the prosecution hypothesis is generally
straightforward (‘the known and unknown samples were produced
by one and the same speaker’), specifying the defence hypothesis in a
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valid way is surprisingly problematic, since ‘not produced by the same
speaker’ is insufficient for statistical analysis (Hughes et al 2018).

A further problem is the difficulty of determining which specific
utterances should rightly be included in the ‘unknown’ sample. In
many cases, the unknown sample comprises more than one utterance
– sometimes spread over multiple recordings, and often occurring
within complex conversations featuring numerous voices in indistinct
audio – all of which makes speaker attribution highly problematic.
Yet it is surprisingly common for expert analysts simply to accept the
police-attributed voices as the unknown sample (Fraser 2018c).
Finally, it is worth remembering that the point of expert evidence is
not for the expert to reach a reliable conclusion, but for the jury to reach
a reliable conclusion – or at least, perhaps more importantly, to prevent
the jury from reaching a misleading conclusion. Communicating
complex scientific results involving advanced statistics to a jury is a
major hurdle for any field of forensic science (Martire 2018). Again,
these difficulties are magnified for speaker comparison evidence,
especially by the fact that it is so easy for listeners to ‘reach their own
conclusion’ about speech evidence, with insufficient recognition of how
often their ‘own conclusions’ are confident but wrong.
Expert evidence is a useful and necessary, but partial, corrective to
problems of current legal practice regarding identification of speakers
in covert recordings (McGorrery et al 2016). It might be preferable
to aim for practices that reduce the mismatch between legal and
linguistic perspectives on voice evidence – via the collaborative research
recommended by proponents of the Call to Action (Fraser 2018b).
6. Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated several kinds of acoustic injustice
arising from misconceptions within the law that allow a transcript to
be treated merely as ‘assistance’ rather than as evidence in its own right.
We end by reflecting on a quote from the Washington Law Review
more than a decade ago:
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Rather than treating a transcript as a non-evidentiary “aid to
understanding” the recording […], a transcript of a recording should
be recognized for what it is, i.e., opinion evidence as to the contents
of the recording, and its admissibility should be governed by the
same rules and procedures that apply to opinion evidence generally.
(Fishman 2006: 523)

While we agree wholeheartedly with the first point, we note that
the powerful effect a transcript can exert on listeners’ perception of who
is speaking and what is being said means that ‘procedures that apply to
opinion evidence generally’ may not be enough to solve the problems
identified above. Finding an adequate solution requires linguistics,
law and law enforcement working together to develop and implement
transparent, evidence-based procedures that ensure all covert recordings
are provided with a demonstrably reliable transcript before they enter
the trial process. The Research Hub for Language in Forensic Evidence,
established as a direct result of the successful Call to Action discussed
above, seeks to develop a collaborative research program to achieve
this (Fraser 2020b).
Endnotes
1. Though the first author wrote the text, both authors contributed equally
to the content.
2. Experience the McGurk effect here: https://w w w.youtube.com/
watch?v=2k8fHR9jKVM.
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